Refer to Chapter 8 - Safety Assessments in Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems to complete this assignment. Choose a small UAS (SUAS) that is currently in use in either the commercial or military sector and develop an Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessment tool (Example figure 8.3, pp.128) that its operators can use to mitigate the risks associated with the SUASs operations. You will be expected to show the development process of your ORM Assessment Tool by completing a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL), Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA), Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A), and finally an ORM Assessment Tool that can be used by the SUAS operators to safely assess their ability to accomplish the mission.

Small UAS Operational Risk Management

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

ASCI 638 Human Factors in Unmanned Aerospace Systems

May 6, 2017

For this assignment, the DJI Matrice 600 Pro was chosen for the development of an Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessment tool. The Matrice 600 Pro is designed for professional aerial photography, cinematography, and other industrial applications. This UAS has a recommended maximum takeoff weight of 15.5kg (34.2 lbs) (DJI, 2017). According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidelines, this is considered a small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) due to its weight of less than 55lbs (FAA, 2016, para. 4.2.7).

The ORM assessment tool starts by developing a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) (Shappee, 2012). The PHL begins with brainstorming to list all potential hazards. The PHL assigns a number to a hazard for identification purposes. From there, a name or title is assigned along with a probability and severity level. The probability and severity levels can then be combined into a matrix used to assign a risk level such as that in MIL-STD-882D, Table A-III (FAA, 2000, p. 20). If in the design stages of a system, a qualitative approach based on research may be needed to assign values to these levels. An excellent source for defining these levels is MIL-STD-882D (FAA, 2000, pp. 18-20).

Once the initial PHL is complete, it is used to complete a Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA) (Shappee, 2012) which is basically a continuation of the PHL. The PHA lists mitigation action(s) that can be used to solve or at least reduce the probability and/or severity of the hazard. With the mitigation action(s) in mind, its impact on the hazard is used to recalculate a new risk level known as the residual risk level. These residual risk levels can then be used to develop risk categories. The risk categories will indicate what actions should be taken by personnel in the occurrence of the hazard during normal operations.

After completing the PHA, it will be primarily up to the system operators to identify and document the hazards they encounter. This can be done with an Operational Hazard Review & Analysis (OHR&A) (Shappee, 2012). The OHR&A can be used to evaluate the mitigation actions of the PHA. It also serves as a useful tool in identifying new, unforeseen hazards and mitigation options.

For the purposes of this paper, a short PHL was started for brevity based on a list by Shappee (2012). The hazard identification numbers are arbitrary and do not represent priority levels. The probability, severity, and risk levels were derived from MIL-STD-882D (FAA, 2000, pp. 18-20) based on previous qualitative research of sUAS such as the DJI Matrice 600 Pro.

Based on the PHL, a PHA was then initiated. The PHA in this case focuses exclusively on mitigation of the hazards found in the PHL. As previously mentioned, mitigation actions attempt to eliminate or reduce the hazard probability or severity found in the PHL. By doing so, the reduced risk level, or residual risk level, for each hazard is then calculated. This new value is then used to determine how occurrences of these hazards will be addressed later. 

Unlike the PHL and PHA that are typically used by designers to develop solutions to hazards, the OHR&A is primarily used by operators. In this case, the OHR&A can be used to document hazards encountered during various operations of the DJI Matrice 600 Pro. In some cases, operators may discover new mitigation actions for previously identified hazards. These new mitigation actions can be documented on the OHR&A and forwarded up the chain of command as necessary to make changes in the UAS or policies and procedures. Additionally, if new hazards are encountered, they too can be documented on the OHR&A for further analysis. Likewise, if the original probability or severity of a hazard as defined in the PHL is proving incorrect, the OHR&A can be used to document evidence for changes to these levels. In this simulated instance, operators are discovering battery fires occur more frequently than previously forecasted in the PHL. However, the severity of damage from these fires is less than forecasted resulting in a lower risk level than forecasted in the PHA. The subsequent mitigation action being recommended in the notes column will likely further reduce the frequency of battery fires further reducing the residual risk. 

Based on the knowledge gained from all this hazard identification and analysis, an effective ORM analysis tool can be created. An ORM analysis tool can act as a preflight go/no-go tool (Shappee, 2012) based on the total score of listed safety factors similar to a mission essential list (MEL). The difference is, the ORM analysis tool assigns hazard risk levels to each item. A decision to fly, or require higher-level management approval, can be made based on the total score when compared to the risk level key. This tool not only accounts for aircraft equipment or systems, but can also include environmental and personnel factors. 

In summary, there are many safety factors to consider when dealing with sUAS. From the beginning of design stages to operational flying, safety requirements must be considered. At each stage of development, those standards must be met or adapted to ensure the safety of all parties involved. The ORM assessment tool can be a vital aid in the decision to safe flight of an sUAS. 

References

DJI. (2017). Matrice 600 Pro specs. Retrieved from http://www.dji.com/matrice600-pro/info#specs

Orlady, H., & Orlady, L. (1999). Human factors in multi-crew flight operations. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Shappee, E., J. (2012). Safety assessments. In R. K. Barnhart, S. B. Hottman, D. M. Marshall, & E. Shappee (Eds.), Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (pp. 123-135). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (2000). Standard practice for system safety (MIL-STD-882D). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/risk_management/ss_handbook/media/app_h_1200.pdf

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (2016, June 16). Small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) (Ac 107-2). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/AC_107-2_AFS-1_Signed.pdf